Sample Audit
Real work, fully anonymised. Everything else is exactly how it’s done.
| Item | Summary |
|---|---|
| Client | REDACTED |
| Developer / scheme | REDACTED |
| Investor profile | Private investor with approximately £400,000 deployable capital |
| Existing position | One existing buy-to-let property in Leeds, purchased two years ago |
| Proposed acquisition | Two-bedroom off-plan apartment on the eastern fringe of Manchester city centre |
| Listed price | £450,000 |
| Advertised rent on proposed unit | £2,200 per calendar month |
| Headline marketing yield | “Up to 8.5%”: calculated against cheapest one-bedroom units in the scheme |
| Yield on proposed two-bedroom unit | 5.87% at advertised rent; approximately 4.7%–4.9% at currently achievable market rent |
| Completion timeline | Approximately two years |
| Incentives | Furniture pack, legal fees paid by developer, twelve months free management |
| Initial view | Not a clean proceed |
| Audit status | Further investigation required before commitment |
The investor has approximately £400,000 of deployable capital and currently owns one buy-to-let property in Leeds, purchased two years ago.
They are considering this acquisition as their second investment property.
Their stated objective is long-term capital growth and net income over roughly ten years. They would prefer a hands-off investment and have done independent reading on property investment, but have not previously been pitched an off-plan scheme.
The proposed acquisition is a two-bedroom flat in an off-plan development on the eastern fringe of Manchester city centre.
The listed price is £450,000.
The advertised rent on this specific unit is £2,200 per calendar month, producing a gross yield of 5.87% on the asking price.
The development’s wider marketing material leads with a headline figure of “up to 8.5% gross yield”: this figure is calculated against the cheapest one-bedroom units in the scheme, priced at approximately £230,000–£260,000. It does not apply to the unit being proposed to this investor.
Estimated completion is approximately two years from the current date.
The investor was originally enquiring about a different property: a completed listing on a major property portal. They were contacted by the developer’s sales team, who suggested that this off-plan scheme would suit them better given their stated investment objectives.
Within that scheme, the investor expressed interest in a one-bedroom unit. The sales team then steered them toward the two-bedroom option, citing stronger long-term capital growth potential and greater family-tenant demand.
That shift forms part of the audit scope because it changes the investor’s capital exposure, alters the deal economics, and moves the investor away from the unit type that produced the headline yield in the development’s marketing material.
The offer includes:
The presence of incentives does not automatically make the acquisition weak. However, incentives should be tested against the underlying price, comparable market evidence and the true economic position of the buyer.
A furniture pack, legal fee contribution or free management period may reduce visible friction, but it does not necessarily improve the quality of the underlying asset.
The investor’s initial enquiry was on a different completed property listed on a major property portal.
They were later contacted by the developer’s sales agent, who suggested that this off-plan scheme would suit them better given their stated investment objectives.
That sales pathway is relevant. The audit is not only assessing the property. It is also assessing the route by which the investor arrived at the opportunity, the assumptions introduced during that process, and whether the recommendation appears aligned with the investor’s position.
2 — Audit scopeThis is a Property Decision Audit.
It assesses the proposed acquisition as a capital decision before the investor commits further.
This audit assesses
This audit does not provide
The investor’s existing single buy-to-let property does not yet constitute a complex portfolio for this purpose. A broader Portfolio Structure review would only be relevant if the investor’s wider position (borrowing, equity, liquidity, tax structure and future acquisition strategy) needed to be assessed in detail.
3 — Executive viewThis is not a clean proceed.
The opportunity may still be capable of passing further review. The route to a proceed exists, and it is set out in section 8. It is a narrow one. But the current information does not justify commitment.
The pricing, yield framing, sales pathway, unit recommendation and completion timeline all require deeper investigation before the investor should reserve, exchange or commit further capital.
On the information provided, the pitch appears to rely on a headline yield that does not apply to the proposed unit, an advertised rent that may not be supported by current market evidence, and a sales process that has shifted the investor away from the unit type producing the marketing figures.
None of those points automatically make the acquisition unsuitable.
Together, they create enough uncertainty that proceeding without further investigation would be poor decision discipline.
4 — Primary concernsThe 8.5% figure leading the development’s marketing materials is calculated against the cheapest one-bedroom units in the scheme, priced around £230,000–£260,000.
The proposed two-bedroom unit at £450,000 with advertised rent of £2,200 per calendar month produces a gross yield of 5.87%, already materially below the headline.
Further, the advertised rent itself may not be supported by current market evidence. Initial research into comparable two-bedroom rentals in the immediate area suggests current achievable rent may be closer to £1,750–£1,850 per calendar month. Recalculating at currently achievable rent gives a gross yield of approximately 4.7%–4.9% on the proposed unit.
The investor is therefore being shown a headline yield (8.5%) that applies to a unit they are being steered away from, on a deal whose actual yield on the recommended unit is materially lower: somewhere between 4.7% and 5.87% depending on which rent assumption is used.
This is the central pricing concern of the audit.
The £450,000 asking price appears to sit materially above comparable completed two-bedroom stock in the same broad area.
Initial review suggests recent completed transactions have closed closer to £375,000–£395,000, with some higher-floor or better-positioned units reaching slightly above that range.
On current information, the off-plan premium appears to be approximately 15–20% above comparable completed resale value.
That premium may be justified if the scheme offers genuinely superior specification, location, amenity, tenant appeal, management structure or future capital growth potential.
However, that justification should not be assumed from the brochure.
The key question is whether the investor is buying genuine future value or simply paying today for growth that has already been priced into the off-plan sale.
The investor originally enquired about a different completed property.
They were redirected to an off-plan scheme.
Within that scheme, they were moved from an initial one-bedroom interest to a higher-priced two-bedroom unit.
The reasoning offered (stronger capital growth and better long-term tenant demand) may be valid in some contexts. Two-bedroom units can, in certain schemes and locations, offer broader tenant appeal and stronger exit flexibility.
However, in this case the recommendation should be tested rather than accepted.
The recommendation also moved the investor away from the unit type that produces the headline yield in the development’s marketing. If the 8.5% yield was attractive enough to draw the investor’s initial interest, the steering toward a unit where the yield falls to 5.87% (or lower on realistic rent) is a structural shift in the deal economics that the investor may not have fully registered.
The audit would need to establish whether the two-bedroom unit is genuinely superior for this investor’s stated objectives, or whether the recommendation is influenced by availability, sales targets, margin, commission structure or the developer’s need to move particular stock.
The issue is not that the sales team recommended a different unit.
The issue is that the recommendation increased the investor’s exposure, materially reduced the yield on the deal, and should therefore be independently justified.
The proposed acquisition is expected to complete in approximately two years.
That creates several forms of timing risk.
By completion, lending conditions may have changed. Rental demand may have shifted. Valuation evidence may differ from today’s assumptions. Service charge estimates may have moved. Comparable sales may or may not support the contract price.
The wider regeneration narrative may also have developed, stalled or been repriced by the market.
This matters because the investor is being asked to commit capital today to an asset that will be valued, financed and rented under future market conditions.
In off-plan acquisitions, the risk is not only whether the building completes.
The risk is whether the completed asset still supports the price, rent and exit assumptions used at the point of sale.
The investor’s stated preference is hands-off ownership, long-term capital growth and net income over roughly ten years.
The pitch appears to align with that at surface level: new-build apartment, professional tenant market, management included, future regeneration narrative, projected rental income.
However, the underlying fit is not yet proven.
For a second acquisition, the investor is still in the early stage of building their position. A high-value off-plan flat with uncertain completion, pricing, rental and exit assumptions may introduce more risk concentration than the headline presentation suggests.
The fact that a property appears hands-off operationally does not mean it is hands-off strategically.
A low-maintenance asset can still be a high-risk capital decision.
5 — Risk Filter snapshotThe full Risk Filter scoring method is not reproduced in this sample.
The following is an illustrative snapshot of how the proposed acquisition would initially be framed for further review.
| Factor | Initial view | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Mortgageability and exit liquidity | Requires investigation | Future lender appetite, valuation support and resale demand are not yet proven |
| Stock durability | Conditional | New-build quality, service charge assumptions and long-term maintenance profile need testing |
| Location resilience | Mixed | The area has a growth narrative, but current pricing appears to rely heavily on future improvement |
| Upside potential | Unproven | The asking price may already price in much of the expected regeneration benefit |
| True net yield | Weak on current evidence | Yield on proposed unit is 5.87% at advertised rent and lower on realistic market rent |
The opportunity does not currently pass as a straightforward acquisition.
The most important concern is not one single flaw. It is the accumulation of conditional assumptions:
This does not automatically mean reject.
It means the investor should not proceed on the basis of the current pitch material.
6 — Industry Decoder observationsThe full Industry Decoder analysis is not reproduced in this sample.
However, several surface-level observations would warrant investigation.
The investor did not begin by seeking this specific off-plan scheme.
They enquired about a different completed property and were then introduced to this development.
That matters because the investor may believe they are being advised toward the best fit, when in practice they may have entered a stock-distribution pathway.
The audit would need to establish whether the proposed scheme is genuinely the best available match or simply the available product being distributed through that channel.
The investor’s initial interest was in a one-bedroom unit.
The recommendation shifted toward a higher-priced two-bedroom unit.
That shift moved the investor away from the unit type that produces the headline yield in the development’s marketing. The deal economics changed materially between the unit the investor was initially drawn to and the unit they were recommended.
This may be justified. But it should be supported by evidence.
The audit would need to test:
The offer includes a furniture pack, paid legal fees and twelve months of free management.
These may provide some genuine value. But they should be assessed in context.
If the asking price is materially above comparable completed stock, incentives may function less as added value and more as a way to reduce purchase friction while preserving the headline price.
A buyer should not treat incentives as independent value until the underlying price has been tested.
The 8.5% headline appears in the development’s marketing materials but is calculated against the cheapest one-bedroom units in the scheme.
The proposed two-bedroom unit, at £450,000 with advertised rent of £2,200 per calendar month, has a gross yield of 5.87%, and likely closer to 4.7%–4.9% on currently achievable market rent.
This is a common pattern in off-plan marketing. The headline yield is constructed using whichever unit produces the most attractive figure, then applied as a development-wide marketing claim even though no individual buyer can achieve it on the unit they end up purchasing. The headline is technically accurate for one product and structurally misleading for every other unit in the scheme.
A useful review separates the marketed yield from the yield on the specific unit being sold to this investor. The two are rarely the same.
The pitch appears to rely partly on future regeneration and wider area improvement.
Regeneration can be a valid investment factor.
But it should not be treated as a blanket justification for any price, any rent assumption or any off-plan premium.
The audit would need to separate:
Before any commitment, the investor should establish the following.
Pricing and valuationProceed Subject to Conditions
The following must be evidenced before any commitmentThe conditions above are not equivalent, and it is worth separating them before treating the list as a set of tasks.
Three can be established independently. The developer’s track record on previous schemes, the liquidity of the local resale market, and whether the acquisition fits the investor’s wider position can all be assessed without the seller’s cooperation, using public records, completed transaction data and the investor’s own circumstances.
Four depend on evidence held by the party who benefits from the sale. Comparable evidence supporting £450,000, current market data supporting £2,200 per calendar month, the justification for the two-bedroom recommendation over the investor’s original one-bedroom interest, and the credibility of the service charge and management assumptions would in practice all be supplied by the developer or the selling agent.
That does not make such evidence worthless. It does mean it should be held to a higher standard than evidence the investor assembled himself, not a lower one. The natural response to receiving a document from a salesperson is relief that the question has been answered. The more useful response is to ask how the document was assembled and what was left out of it.
And two cannot currently be established by anyone. Lender appetite and valuation support at completion cannot be known two years in advance, because the answer does not yet exist. The same applies to the state of the exit market at the point this investor eventually sells.
That is not a gap in the file. It is a structural feature of buying two years before completion, and it is the part of the risk that no amount of diligence removes.
Two further points follow from that.
The two pricing conditions are the hardest of all, and not for evidential reasons. Completed comparable evidence appears to sit at £375,000 to £395,000, and currently achievable rent appears to sit closer to £1,750 to £1,850 per calendar month. Evidence supporting £450,000 and £2,200 would have to contradict the evidence already available. In practice, those two conditions are more likely to be satisfied by an adjustment to the price than by the production of a document.
Only one condition sits entirely within the investor’s own control: understanding and accepting the actual yield on the unit being sold, rather than the headline figure calculated on a unit he is not buying. That one costs nothing, requires no cooperation from anybody, and should be done first.
If the conditions cannot be met, the investor should either reject the opportunity or pause until better evidence exists.
Not a clean proceed. The conditions above are the route to a proceed, but they are not evenly achievable. Two cannot be answered by anyone at this stage. Four rest on evidence produced by the party making the sale. The two pricing conditions would require evidence that contradicts the evidence already available.
Reservation or exchange would be premature on the current information.
Based on the information provided, the appropriate next step is not reservation. The appropriate next step is investigation.
The opportunity may still be capable of passing review, but the current pitch relies on a headline yield that does not apply to the proposed unit, an advertised rent that may not be supported by current market evidence, a price that appears materially above comparable resale stock, and a sales process that has shifted the investor away from the unit type producing the marketing figures.
Until those points are tested, the investor would be taking on more risk than the headline yield suggests.
9 — Scope of this documentThis is a single-property audit. It assesses one proposed acquisition against one investor’s stated position and objectives.
Portfolio-level engagements extend further: structural review across existing and proposed holdings, capital deployment sequencing, acquisition prioritisation, ongoing recommendation, and market monitoring as conditions change.
The Risk Filter and Industry Decoder methodologies applied in this audit are published separately by Lucas James Property Advisors and applied consistently across all engagements.
A full Property Decision Audit expands this sample into a written assessment of the property, assumptions, structure and decision. Depending on the opportunity, it may include:
The purpose is to identify whether the proposed decision deserves capital before the investor becomes emotionally, legally or financially committed. A Property Decision Audit is most useful in situations where the cost of being wrong is materially higher than the audit fee.
10 — Closing noteIndependent analysis exists to test a decision before capital is legally committed. Once contracts are exchanged, the cost of being wrong is no longer just a fee — it is the cost of the asset itself.
Already own a property you’re uncertain about? See the Property Decision Audit →
11 — Where to go from hereMost people who read this document do not need to buy anything from me. The first two routes below reflect that.
You have not committed to anything yet, and you want to be harder to sell to.
Ten Questions is a free list of what to put to anybody selling you a property, and the non-answers to watch for. No email required. If you want the method rather than the questions — the Risk Filter, the Industry Decoder, the scoring bands, the worked examples — that is the Framework, £450, applied by you to anything you are shown.
You have a specific property in front of you and you want it assessed properly.
That is the Property Decision Audit, from £1,500. One property, one written assessment, a call to establish the position and a call to take you through the findings. It reaches a recommendation rather than a summary, and my fee is identical whichever way it lands.
You already own something and you are no longer sure about it.
The audit works the same way on a property you hold. Where the question extends past the property itself to what the capital behind it should be doing over the next five to ten years, the audit is delivered with a Forward Plan attached, the Framework on engagement, and twelve months of scored deal flow: £3,000 in total.
You are deploying capital across several decisions rather than one.
That is the Advisory Mandate, from £12,500 for twelve months. Portfolio strategy, ongoing acquisition analysis, refinancing, quarterly review and a written decision log.
And where none of those is the answer.
If the question turns on pensions, tax, mortgage products or conveyancing, it belongs to an independent financial adviser, an accountant, a broker or a solicitor, and I will say so rather than answer it. If the capital involved is small enough that a fee would consume a meaningful share of it, the honest answer is the Framework, or nothing at all.
To begin any of the paid routes, send a short note describing the decision you are weighing. If it is the right route, the scope and fee are confirmed in writing before any work starts.
Enquire About An Audit